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Forum on R. v. R.D.S.
April Burey* No Dichotomies: Reflections on
Equality for African Canadians
in R. v. R.D.S.**
Every valley shall be exalted, and every mountain and hill shall be made
low: and the crooked shall be made straight, and the rough places plain
Isaiah 40:4
Preface
The contrasts, in form and substance, were stark. In form, I was a black
woman in a wheelchair, pleading before an all-white, able-bodied and
almost all-male Supreme Court of Canada.1 The usually empty public
galleries in the Ottawa courtroom were filled with people of colour, who
had come from across the country to witness the hearing of this landmark
case.2 On their entrance, the nine white judges, dressed in their staid,
black robes made an almost audible gasp as they were met with this
colourfully clad, intently silent band of people of colour.
In substance, the case directly raised before the Court issues of race and
racism, though in its earlier Charter decisions the Court, as though
functioning in a colour-blind world, had not ruled on racial equality. The
case raised fundamental issues of the apparent contrast between an
objective notion of judicial impartiality and the subjective, personal
experience of the black, female judge of first instance. In substance too,
*B .A., LL.B. (Dalhousie), LL.M. (Harvard). My profound thanks go to my beloved teachers,
Professors Derrick Bell and Leon Trakman, my professors at Harvard and Dalhousie respec-
tively, who both gave insightful and very helpful comments to earlier drafts of this paper. They
have also generously given me much needed academic, political and spiritual encouragement
far beyond this paper.
** This paper's exploration of no dichotomies rests in much of critical legal thought: see, for
example, C. Lawrence, "The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning With Unconscious
Racism" (1987) 39 Stan. L. Rev. 317; M. Minnow, "Justice Engendered" (1987) 101 Harv. L.
Rev. 10; J. Singer, "The Player and The Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory" (1984) 94 Yale L.
J. 1.
1. On that memorable day, March 10, 1997, when R. v. R.D.S. was heard in the Supreme Court
of Canada, three black lawyers argued. Burnley "Rocky" Jones appeared on behalf of the
accused/appellant. Yola Grant appeared for L.E.A.F. I appeared for an intervening coalition of
black groups, the African Canadian Legal Clinic, the Afro-Canadian Caucus of Nova Scotia
and the Congress of Black Women of Canada (hereinafter referred to as the Coalition).
2. I was later informed that many of those who came did not get into the courtroom as the
public galleries were already full to overflowing.
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I was attempting to transform the written, technical arguments made in
my factum and to passionately articulate new, dynamic, moral and
political issues in an old, established, static, legal structure.
I felt like the quintessentially powerless, silent-silenced, "outsider-
other" individual, trying to be heard by an ultimately powerful, "insider-
normative" institution.
The form and substance of these manifold and manifest contrasts were
to merge and then melt away as R. v. R.D.S. unfolded. In the final analysis,
the case stands as a powerful and positive witness to the revelation that,
in equality, there are essentially no dichotomies in apparent contrasts of
whatever kind.
Introduction
R. v. RD.S.3 involved the appeal of the judgment of an African Canadian
female judge to acquit an African Canadian youth,on the basis that it gave
rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.
The case presented several contrasts which appeared as dichotomies of
the objective versus the subjective; normative versus "other" perspec-
tives; the legal versus the moral and political; the reasoned and reasonable
versus the passionate and experiential; the powerful "insiders" versus the
powerless "outsiders"; public versus private; and white versus black.
What follows in this short paper is a hopeful telling of the merging and
melting of those apparent contrasts into no dichotomies. The paper
proceeds in three parts. First, I discuss the decision in the Supreme Court
of Canada. The bulk of the paper is dedicated to the second part. In it, I
discuss some future implications of the case for the equality of African
Canadians, both within and outside of the Charter and law. Third, I give
some concluding thoughts.
I have an express purpose in focusing on the revelation of no dichoto-
mies in R.D.S. That purpose is to call us all to a sober, thoughtful and
compassionate return to the essential value underlying Section 15, the
Charter as a whole, and indeed the laws of any society based on the
equality of all. This essential value is the equality of those most vulner-
able and disadvantaged among us. Dichotomies divide. Their basic
function is to keep some people in and others out. They serve to
marginalize and silence the powerless while privileging and centralizing
the voice of the powerful. They rely on divisions, both hidden and
explicit, to defeat the essential task of equality.
3. R. v. RD.S., [1997] 3 S.C.R. 484 [hereinafter RD.S.].
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Focusing on those most vulnerable among us calls us to our truest
selves. Since I deeply believe that we are all part of, One with each other,
the exclusion of one of us implicates us all. The African Canadian
experience in law reveals that vulnerability on the basis of race is a
present, pernicious reality, which must be acknowledged and overcome
if the mandate of equality is to succeed. Further, focusing on those living
at the intersections of these vulnerabilities- for example, black women -
illuminates the equality of the whole. R.D.S. provides that focus.
I. The R.D.S. Decision in the Supreme Court of Canada
1. Facts and Lower Court Decisions Appealed From
4
R. D. S. is an African Canadian youth. On 17 October 1993, in Halifax,
Nova Scotia, he was arrested by a white police officer and charged with
three offences.' He was 15 years old at the time. His trial proceeded in a
Halifax Youth Court before the Honourable Judge Corrine Sparks, an
African Canadian female judge. At the trial there were only two wit-
nesses, R.D.S. himself and the white police officer, Constable Stienburg.
Since their testimony as to the events leading to the arrest differed widely,
their credibility would determine the outcome of the case.
On the one hand, Constable Stienburg testified that, on the day in
question, he was riding with his partner in their police cruiser when a radio
transmission advised that other officers were in pursuit of a stolen van
whose occupants were "non-white" youths. As the constable and his
partner drove along, they saw two black youths running across the street.
Steinburg then detained one of those youths, N .R., as his partner pursued
the other youth. While Constable Stienburg was standing with N.R., the
accused R.D.S. ran into the constable' s legs with his bicycle, yelled at him
and pushed him. The constable then placed R.D.S. under arrest.
On the other hand, R.D.S. testified that, on the day in question, he had
been riding his bike from his grandmother's to his mother's house when
he saw a police car and a crowd standing beside it. He said that he was
being "nosey" when he stopped to look. He saw that his cousin, N.R., was
in handcuffs and tried to talk to him to ask whether he, R.D.S., should tell
N.R.'s mother what had happened. Constable Stienburg then told him
4. The following synopsis is based on Cory J.'s summary of the facts and lower court
decisions, ibid. at 513-22.
5. The three offenses were: unlawfully assaulting Constable Donald Stienburg; unlawfully
assaulting Constable Stienburg with the intention of preventing the arrest of N.R. (another
youth); and unlawfully resisting Constable Stienburg in the lawful execution of his duty.
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"Shut up, shut up, or you'll be under arrest too." When R.D.S. again
sought to elicit a response from N.R, the constable then put both youths
in chokeholds. He further testified that at no point did he intend to, or in
fact, run into the officer with his bike, speak to the officer- since he spoke
only to N.R.-or touch, much less push, the officer.6
The Honourable Judge Corrine Sparks entered an acquittal of R.D.S.
on all three charges. In her oral reasons, delivered at the trial's close, she
reviewed the opposing testimony of both witnesses and basically ac-
cepted the youth's testimony. She found that the Crown had not dis-
charged its onus of proving its case beyond a reasonable doubt. She noted,
in particular, that she found R.D.S. to be a "rather honest young boy" and
that his testimony had a "ring of truth."
The Crown had specifically asked the judge why she would not believe
the testimony of the police officer over that of the youth and she
concluded her oral reasons with the remarks that gave rise to the appeal.
They were:
The Crown says, well, why would the officer say that events occurred in
the way in which he has relayed them to the Court this morning. I am not
saying that the Constable has misled the court, although police officers
have been known to do that in the past. I am not saying that the officer
overreacted, but certainly police officers do overreact, particularly when
they are dealing with non-white groups. That to me indicates a state of
mind right there that is questionable. I believe that probably the situation
in this particular case is the case of a young police officer who overreacted.
I do accept the evidence of [R.D.S.] that he was told to shut up or he would
be under arrest. It seems to be in keeping with the prevalent attitude of the
day.
At any rate, based upon my comments and based upon all the evidence
before the Court, I have no other choice but to acquit.7
About one month later, the judge issued written reasons, supplemental to
those delivered orally at the close of the trial.8 Though these reasons did
not form part of any appeal ,9 it is worthwhile noting her observation that
"the racial configuration in the court [during the trial] ... consisted of the
accused, the defence counsel, the court reporter and the judge all being of
African-Canadian ancestry."' 0
6. I am informed that all charges against N.R. regarding the stolen van were later dropped.
7. Supra note 3 at 517-18.
8. R. v. R-DS., [1994] N.SJ. No. 629 (QL).
9. RDS., supra note 3 at 523.
10. Supra note 8 at para. 6; see also the dissenting reasons of Freeman J.A. in R. v. RD.S.
(1995), 145 N.S.R. (2d) 284 at 294 (C.A.).
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The Crown appealed the decision to acquit the youth on the basis that
it gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.1' Both the Nova Scotia
Supreme Court'" and the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal, 3 Freeman J.A.
dissenting, upheld the Crown's position, finding that the decision gave
rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.
2. The Reasons of the Supreme Court of Canada
By a majority of six to three, the Supreme Court of Canada, in allowing
the R.D.S. appeal, restored the judgment of acquittal at trial and found that
the trial judge's decision did not give rise to a reasonable apprehension
of bias. Four judges in the majority were firmly on the side of the trial
judge's decision, holding that there was no reasonable apprehension of
bias . Two of the six judges, while forming part of the majority in result,
issued separate reasons, 5 finding that though her remarks were "close to
the line,"'1 6 they did not give rise to an apprehension of bias. The three
judges in the minority firmly dissented in the result and found that the
impugned remarks did give rise to such apprehended bias. 7
L'Heureux-Dub6 and McLachlin JJ. jointly wrote the reasons for four
of the six judges in the majority. I intend to focus here on those reasons
and will indicate where they were concurred in by the other justices, both
the other two in the majority and the three in dissent.
L'Heureux-Dub6 and McLachlin JJ. gave the applicable test,'18 agreed
with by the other justices 9 when they stated that the test for reasonable
apprehension of bias was that set out by de Grandpr6, J. in Committee for
Justice and Liberty v. National Energy Board
the apprehension of bias must be a reasonable one, held by reasonable and
right-minded persons, applying themselves to the question and obtaining
thereon the required information .... [T]hat test is 'what would an
informed person, viewing the matter realistically and practically-and
11. The Crown also appealed on the basis of actual bias. After the first level of appeal, the
case proceeded only on apprehended bias.
12. R. v. R-D.S., [1995] N.S. J. No. 184 (QL), decision of Glube, C.J.S.C.
13. Supra note 10.
14. Supra note 3 at 501-13. Madame Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 and Madame Justice McLachlin
wrote these majority reasons in which La Forest and Gonthier JJ. concurred.
15. Ibid. at 513-48. Cory, J. wrote these reasons in which lacobucci, J. concurred.
16. Ibid. at 545.
17. Ibid. at 493-500. Major, J. wrote these reasons in which Lamer CJ. and Sopinka J.
concurred.
18. Ibid. at 502.
19. Ibid. at 497,530-31.
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having thought the matter through -conclude. Would he think that it is
more likely than not that [the decision-maker], whether consciously or
unconsciously, would not decide fairly.'
The grounds for this apprehension must, however, be substantial and I...
[refuse] to accept the suggestion that the test be related to the 'very
sensitive or scrupulous conscience. '20
They noted that the presumption of the impartiality of judges carries
considerable weight. Their decisions have enjoyed considerable defer-
ence by appellate courts when the latter inquire into questions of bias .21
In addition, when assessing bias, the impugned, oral decision must be
read as a whole and not certain comments in isolation. z2
In discussing whether a reasonable person would apprehend bias,
Justices L'Heureux-Dub6 and McLachlin highlighted the necessary
diversity of life experiences all judges must bring to adjudication. For
example, they noted that judges in a "bilingual, multiracial and
multicultural society will undoubtedly approach the task of judging from
their varied perspectives 23 and that these perspectives must reflect a
variety of experiences, if the judiciary is to be diverse .24 Such diversity of
experience is not antithetical to an impartial judiciary, but rather an
integral part of it.25
Moreover,judges must inquire into the context within which litigation
arises.2 6 This inquiry into context is not only consistent with judicial
impartiality, it may also be seen as its "essential precondition ."27 Any
reasonable person would possess knowledge of the racial dynamics of the
community, including its history of "widespread and systemic discrimi-
nation against black and aboriginal people, and high profile clashes
between the police and the visible minority population over policing
20. [1978] 1 S.C.R. 369 at 394.
21. Supra note 3 at 503: Forjudges "are assumed to be [people] of conscience and intellectual
discipline, capable of judging a particular controversy fairly on the basis of its own circum-
stances": United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409 (1941), at 421. This presumption of judicial
impartiality and high threshold for findings of judicial bias was agreed in by the two other
judges in the majority, supra note 3 at 532-33, 539, 542.
22. RD.S., supra note 3 at 509-10 and concurred in by Cory J., ibid. at 539, 545.
23. Ibid. at 505.
24. Ibid. In their separate reasons which concurred in the result, the two judges also endorsed
diversity and the notion that judicial neutrality included a"wealth of personal... experience":
ibid. at 533-34. Even the dissent paid lip service to "life experience" as an "important
ingredient" in judging: ibid. at 497.
25. On the importance of life experience in judging, see generally, ibid. at 505-6.
26. On the importance of judicial inquiry into the background context, see generally ibid.
at506-7. The other two judges forming the majority in result also agreed with the importance
of context in judicial decision-making: ibid. at 531,535.
27. Ibid. at 507.
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issues."2 8 Awareness of this context would thus not constitute evidence
of bias, but rather be "consistent with the highest tradition of judicial
impartiality."29
Similarly, the reasonable person would support the fundamental
principle of equality set out in section 15 of the Charter and endorsed in
nation-wide, quasi-constitutional provincial and federal human rights
legislation. Such a person would be aware of the history of discrimination
faced by disadvantaged groups in Canadian society protected by the
Charter's equality guarantee.3°
Justices L'Heureux-Dub6 and McLachlin went on specifically to
disagree with the separate reasons of the two judges who concurred in the
majority result, noting that Judge Sparks' comments were not "unfortu-
nate" or "close to the line."' I On the contrary, while Judge Sparks did not
rule that the probable overreaction by Constable Stienburg was motivated
by racism, there was evidence capable of supporting a finding of racially
motivated overreaction. 32 They found that "in alerting herself to the racial
dynamics of the case, [Judge Sparks] was simply engaging in the process
of contextualized judging which... was entirely proper and conducive
to a fair and just resolution of the case before her." 33
In essence, a majority of the Supreme Court of Canada rejected the
false dichotomy between the subjective experiences of the trial judge and
an objective notion of judicial impartiality. In affirming the decision at
trial, the Supreme Court also rejected as false the dichotomy between
normative and "other" perspectives. Nor would it marginalize and silence
the black voice as being biased in an existing context where the white
voice had always been heard as central and unbiased.
The following section explores RD.S.'s implications for a legal
approach to equality that eschews all dichotomies as false. These impli-
cations are explored in four related sections: 1) implications within law;
2) implications within the Charter; 3) implications outside the Charter;
and 4) implications outside law.
28. Ibid. at 508.
29. Ibid. at 509.
30. Ibid. at 507-8.
31. Ibid. at 502.
32. Ibid. at511-12.
33. Ibid. at 513.
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II. Some Future Implications of the Supreme Court's Decision
1. Implications Within Law
a. Judicial Notice of Anti-Black Racism. The False Dichotomy of a
Central White Experience versus a Marginal Black Experience
The Supreme Court's rejection of the false dichotomy between a central
white experience and a marginal, black experience has far-reaching
implications for law in general. Judicial notice34 of anti-black racism in
Canadian society would give general, legal recognition to the centrality
of the African Canadian experience."
In R.D.S., four Supreme Court of Canada judges didjust that36 in citing
with approval the specific passage from the decision of the Ontario Court
of Appeal37 where Doherty J.A. for a unanimous court stated,
Racism, and in particular anti-black racism, is a part of our community's
psyche. A significant segment of our community holds overtly racist
views. A much larger segment subconsciously operates on the basis of
negative racial stereotypes. Furthermore, our institutions, including the
criminal justice system, reflect and perpetuate these negative stereotypes.
These elements combine to infect our society as a whole with the evil of
racism. [Blacks are among the primary victims of that evil.]38
While those four judges specifically noted that the "history of discrimi-
nation faced by disadvantaged groups in Canadian society [is a matter] of
which judicial notice may be taken,"3 9 the other two judges forming the
majority specifically declined to take judicial notice of racism in this
34. Black's Law Dictionary defines judicial notice as, inter alia, "The cognizance of certain
facts which [courts] may properly take and act upon without proof, because they already know
them." Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition (St. Paul, Minn: West Publishing Co., 1990).
35. On the harsh historical and present-day reality of anti-black racism in the African
Canadian experience, see generally, Royal Commission on the Donald Marshall, Jr. Prosecu-
tion: Commissioner's Report: Findings and Recommendations (Halifax: The Commission,
1989); B. Pachai, Beneath the Clouds of the Promised Land: The Survival of Nova Scotia's
Blacks, Vol. 11:1800-1989 (Hantsport, NS: Lancelot Press Ltd., 1990); W. Tarnopolsky and
W. Pentney, Discrimination and the Law (Scarborough: Carswell, 1994); J. W. Walker, The
Black Loyalists: The Searchfor a Promised Land in Nova Scotia and Sierra Leone 1783-1870
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992); R. Winks, The Blacks in Canada: A History, 2nd
ed. (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1997).
36. Supra note 3 at 508.
37. R.v. Parks (1993),15 0. R. (3rd) 324 (C. A.), leave to appeal denied,( 1994] 1 S.C.R.x.;
see following Parks, R. v. Wilson (1996), 29 O.R. (3rd) 97 (C.A.).
38. Parks, ibid. at 342. In that case the issue was whether a potential juror could be challenged
for cause on the basis that the juror might be racially biased. The question permitted by the court
was whether the juror's ability to judge the evidence without bias would be affected by the fact
that the accused was a black man and the deceased white.
39. R.S., supra note 3 at 508.
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case. 4 They did, however, note that evidence "suggests that there is a
realistic possibility that the actions taken by the police in their relations
with visible minorities demonstrate both prejudice and discrimination ...
[and that] racism may have been exhibited by police officers in arresting
young black males."'"
Explicit legal recognition, through judicial notice, of the context of
anti-black racism in Canada, is not biased and antithetical to judicial
impartiality. On the contrary, the very failure to recognize the reality of
this context within which we live, can lead to partiality and bias in
decision-making. It can lead to perpetuation of a racist and unequal status
quo.
Such recognition of the context of anti-black racism was particularly
relevant in RD.S., for as I noted before the Court,
This case involves a reverse triangle. In courts all across this country, a
common case is that of a white judge, a white police officer and a black
accused in the middle. What made and makes this case distinct is that here
we have an African Canadian judge, an African Canadian youth, and a
white police officer in the middle. The issue of race was therefore brought
to the observable centre, in sight and subconscious, in the instant
case .... No one would seriously suggest that anti-black racism has not
been a harsh historical truth and continues to be a present-day reality in
Nova Scotia... . Such a position would be absurd!42
Nor should one fear that this inquiry into context would give license to
those judges seeking to use, for example, their own racist or sexist
experiences in judging. For it is precisely this explicit inquiry into context
that provides judges with the tools to judge rightly. An open, legal
acknowledgment of the realities of the unequal, discriminatory treatment
40. Ibid. at 535. The position of those two judges was that, despite the voluminous material
filed on anti-black racism, since the appellant had not put forward the principles of judicial
notice in this case, it would be inappropriate to do so here. The appellant's contention had been
that references to social context by Judge Sparks simply made use of her background
experience and knowledge. The L.E.A.F. interveners had specifically argued for judicial
notice. The Coalition's position was set out in paragraph 31 of its factum: "Whether Judge
Sparks took judicial notice of and/or used her common sense knowledge in taking race into
account is not at issue in the Coalition's argument. The Coalition does, however, now invite
this Honourable Court to take judicial notice of anti-black racism in Canada."
41. R.D.S., supra note 3 at 544.
42. Ibid. (oral argument of the Coalition). Matters of race and racism were central in this case.
The entire Crown appeal was based on the alleged racial bias of the African Canadian trial
judge. Note too the passage in the four-person majority reasons where they quote Freeman J.A.,
"The case was racially charged, a classic confrontation between a white police officer
representing the power of the state and a black youth charged with an offense": ibid. at 512;
and the racial configuration of the trial court: supra note 8 at para. 6. The Supreme Court's
dissenters chose to "bury their heads in the sand" rather than confront the racial realities of the
case, stating that "[wihether racism exists in our society is not the issue." Supra note 3 at 495.
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in our society of the vulnerable and disadvantaged among us is essential
to judging. As the two judges concurring in the majority result noted in
their separate reasons,"not every favourable or unfavourable disposition
attracts the label of bias or prejudice. For example, it cannot be said that
those who condemn Hitler are biased or prejudiced. This unfavorable
disposition is objectively justifiable-in other words, it is not 'wrongful
or inappropriate.' "'I As the reasons of the four judges in the majority
noted,judicial inquiry into the context or background essential to judging
is not new and may be gained from "expert witnesses.., academic studies
... and from the judge's personal understanding and experience of the
society in which the judge lives and works.""
It is hoped that one future implication of R.D.S within law in general
will be judicial notice of anti-black racism in Canada.45
43. Supra note 3 at 528,where Cory,J. cites Scalia,J. in Litekyv. U.S., 114 S.Ct. 1147 at 1155
(1994). It was precisely this point that the four-person majority made when they said,"[Judicial
impartiality] recognizes as inevitable and appropriate that the differing experiences of judges
assist them in their decision-making process and will be reflected in their judgments, so long
as those experiences are relevant to the cases, are not based on inappropriate stereotypes, and
do not prevent a fair and just determination of the cases based on the facts in evidence": supra
note 3 at 501.
44. Supra note 3 at 507, citing with approval R. v. Lavallee, [ 1990] 1 S. C. R. 852,R. v. Parks,
supra note 37, and Moge v. Moge, [199213 S.C.R. 813. The other two judges concurring in the
majority result also agreed that expert evidence can be used to establish social context, as can
be the personal experience of the adjudicating judge: supra note 3 at 535, 537, 539.
45. Since the writing of this article, but before its publication, the case of R. v. Williams,
[1998] S.C.J. No. 49 QL (unreported judgment rendered 4 June 1998) has been delivered by
the Supreme Court of Canada. In a unanimousjudgment written by MadameJustice McLachlin,
the Supreme Court held that racism against Aboriginal peoples in Canada could be used when
challenging a potential juror for cause. With respect to judicial notice of racism in general, the
Court stated, "Widespread racial prejudice, as a characteristic of the community, may ...
sometimes be the subject of a judicial notice" at 26 of unreported judgment. I submit that a
unanimous Supreme Court has now gone a long way towards taking judicial notice of anti-
black racism in Canada. It quoted with approval several passages from the Ontario Court of
Appeal decision in Parks, supra note 37. It noted the "insidious nature of racial prejudice" ...
"buried deep in the human psyche" and that "racial prejudice and its effects are as invasive as
they are corrosive" at 11-12. The Court stated that "widespread racial prejudice is by definition
not exceptional" at 20 and that"subconscious racism may make it easier to conclude that a black
or aboriginal accused engaged in the crime" at 15. It found that there was "ample evidence [of]
widespread prejudice" against aboriginal people and that "there is evidence that.., widespread
racism has translated into systemic discrimination in the criminal justice system" at 28.
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b. The Inclusion of African Canadians in the Judiciary and in Law
Schools. Diversity and the False Dichotomy of Legal Insiders versus
Outsiders
In R.D.S., all nine judges recognized the constitutional, legislative, moral
and political imperative of diversity.6 As the separate reasons of the two
judges concurring in the majority result stated, "Canada is not an insular,
homogeneous society. It is enriched by the presence and contributions of
citizens of many different races, nationalities and ethnic origins. The
multicultural nature of Canadian society has been recognized in s. 27 of
the Charter.
4 7
It is this very diversity which the judiciary needs in order to fulfill its
adjudicative function in this multiracial and multiethnic society .4 As the
four judges in their majority reasons stated,
[J]udges in a bilingual, multiracial and multicultural society will undoubt-
edly approach the task ofjudging from their varied perspectives. They will
certainly have been shaped by, and gained insight from, their different
experiences, and cannot be expected to divorce themselves from these
experiences on the occasion of their appointment to the bench. In fact, such
a transformation would deny society the benefit of the valuable knowledge
gained by the judiciary while they were members of the Bar. As well, it
would preclude the achievement of a diversity of backgrounds in the
judiciary .41
Indeed, to the Coalition, it seemed that underlying the whole Crown
appeal, and the decisions of the courts below, was an unwillingness and
even inability to accept this diversity. In this regard, the Coalition cited
the judgment of the highly regarded African American jurist,
Higginbotham J.:
46. On diversity in general see e.g., Charter section 27; Canadian Multiculturalism Act,
R.S.C. 1985 (4th Supp.) c. 24; and Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990,c. 43, ss. 43(3) and 49(4)
as am. by Courts of Justice Statute Law Amendment Act, 1994, S. 0. 1994, c. 12, s. 16.
47. Supra note 3 at 524.
48. On diversity in the judiciary, see e.g., Canadian Judicial Council, Commentaries on
Judicial Conduct (Cowansville, Quebec: Yvon Blais, 1991); B.N. Cardozo, The Nature of the
Judicial Process (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1921); R. McMurtry, "Access to Justice
in a Pluralistic Society" (Address to the Canadian Bar Association, 16 October 1996)
[unpublished]; J. Nedelsky, "Embodied Diversity and the Challenges to Law" (1997) 42
McGill L. J. 91; M. Omatsu "The Fiction of Judicial Impartiality" (1997) 9 CJ .W.L. I.; Ontario
Law Reform Commission, Appointing Judges: Philosophy, Politics and Practice (Toronto:
The Commission, 1991); S.M. Smith, "Diversifying The Judiciary: The Influence of Gender
and Race on Judging" (1994) 28 Richmond L. Rev. 178; L. Washington, Black Judges on
Justice (New York: The New Press, 1994); B. Wilson "Will Women Judges Really Make A
Difference" (1990) 28 Osgoode Hall L. J. 50.
49. Supra note 3 at 505. As Cory J. stated, "The sound belief behind the encouragement of
greater diversity in judicial appointments was that women and visible minorities would bring
an important perspective to the difficult task of judging," supra note 3 at 534.
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Perhaps among some whites, there is an inherent disquietude when they
see that occasionally blacks are adjudicating matters pertaining to race
relations, and perhaps that anxiety can be eliminated only by having no
black judges sit on such matters or, if one cannot escape a black judge, then
by having the latter bend over backwards to the detriment of black litigants
and black citizens and thus assure that brand of 'impartiality' which some
whites think they deserve.
If blacks could accept the fact of their manifest absence from the ... judicial
process for almost two centuries, the plain truth is that white litigants are
now going to have to accept the new day where the judiciary will not be
entirely white and where some black judges will adjudicate cases involv-
ing race relations ."
Statistics support the arrival of this diverse "new day."5 1
In arguing this case, it was particularly important for me to impress
upon the Court my own, deep belief in diversity and the moral and legal
necessity of including previously silenced black voices, those among the
most vulnerable and disadvantaged. There, I said,
It is my own personal, firm belief that we are each particular, unique
expressions, the pressing out, of the Universal and Divine. Only God is all-
seeing, omnipotent, omniscient, completely impartial. The moral and
legal mandate of diversity allows us all, collectively, to approach the
knowledge and practical actualization of God ....
For this reason, the goal of impartiality is best assured by making the
judiciary as diverse as possible .... We all need African Canadian female
judges like the Honourable Judge Sparks. And we need alljudges, like her,
to take race into account, where it may be a factor. This is not merely a
policy directive. This is a positive, legal duty.5"
Judge Sparks, the trial judge whose decision was appealed on the basis of
racial bias, was born and raised in the province of Nova Scotia. She is the
first African Canadian judge in that province, which now has only one
other. Further, she is the first African Canadian female judge in all
Canada, and is now one of only two such judges nationwide. 3 As
provincial court judges they sit on the lowest rung of the judiciary. No
African Canadian woman, no other visible minority woman and only one
50. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Local Union 542, International Union of Operating
Engineers, 388 F. Supp. 154 at 177 (1974) [hereinafter Local Union 542], cited in the
Coalition's factum, supra note 3 at para 49.
51. The Toronto Star (I I June 1998) reports that at present almost 41% of Torontonians are
non-white, and that by the year 2001 the figure will be 53%. Statistics Canada reports that its
1996 Census figures show that 11.2% of all Canadians are visible minorities.
52. Supra note 3 (Coalition oral argument).
53. The other African Canadian female judge is the Honourable Micheline Rawlins, who sits
in Windsor, Ontario.
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Aboriginal woman,54 has ever been federally appointed to the bench in
Canada. R.D.S. highlights the desperate need for African Canadians in the
judiciary .
Similarly, the case highlights the necessity of having African Canadi-
ans in law school student bodies and on law faculties. 6 The accused's
lawyer, Burnley "Rocky" Jones, is the unsung hero of this case. R.D.S. is
testament to his courage, to his refusal to give up despite tremendous
odds, and to his committed pursuit of ajust result. His own life experience
as an African Canadian, born and raised in the province where the events
occurred, allowed him to see, understand and pursue the important issues
of racial equality in this case. Nor could the Coalition's factum have been
prepared without the dedicated support of several recent African Cana-
dian law school graduates. 7 Further, with only two tenured black law
professors nationwide, 5 it is small wonder that the African Canadian
perspective has gained scant legal recognition or protection .9
It is therefore hoped that one future implication of R.D.S. will be the
meaningful inclusion of African Canadians in the judiciary and in law
schools.
2. Implications Within the Charter
a. Section 15 and the False Dichotomy of "Norm" versus "Other"
In R.D.S., a majority of the Supreme Court of Canada confronted and
overcame the usually assumed notion that the perspectives of white, male
judges were the "norm" and thus the objective measure to which all
"other" perspectives and experiences must be compared. This rejection
of the false dichotomy of "norm" versus "other" has important ramifica-
tions for equality under Section 15 of the Charter.
54. She is Madame Justice Rose Boyko of the Ontario Court General Division.
55. These statistics are based on my own personal knowledge. Neither the Canadian Judicial
Council nor the Office of the Commissioner for Federal Judicial Appointments keeps statistics
for judicial appointments on the basis of race: interview with G. Beauparlant (28 April 1998).
56. For example, at the University of Toronto, Faculty of Law, where I have taught on a part-
time basis, all tenured professors and all other full-time faculty, with one very recent exception
are white. I understand that in its 1997 graduating class there were no blacks. Furthermore, in
the 1997-98 first year class, there is only one black person.
57. They are Siobhan Alexander, Jewel Amoah, Jacqueline Lawrence, Margaret Parsons,
Michelle Williams and Christopher Wilson of the law schools at the universities of Ottawa,
Toronto, Windsor and York.
58. They are Professor Esmeralda Thornhill at Dalhousie Law School and Professor Toni
Williams at Osgoode Hall Law School.
59. See forthcoming Canadian Bar Association report of its Working Group on Racial
Equality in the Legal Profession.
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In essence, what the cases under Section 15 of the Charter reveal is
that, the closer a claimant is to the unstated and assumed "norm" (white,
male, able-bodied, heterosexual), the more likely the claimant is to be
afforded norm[al], equal treatment. The further from this "norm" claim-
ants fall (i.e., for those claimants most needing equal protection) the less
likely they are to be extended norm[ative], equal treatment!
Section 15 (1) of the Charter provides,
Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the
equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and,
in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic
origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.
The first and leading decision under section 15 from the Supreme Court
of Canada was Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia.6 That case
dealt with equality on the basis of citizenship. Mr. Andrews, the claimant,
met all other requirements to be called to the British Columbia bar as a
lawyer, except that of Canadian citizenship. In striking down as uncon-
stitutional the citizenship requirement, the Court described discrimina-
tion as
a distinction, whether intentional or not but based on grounds relating to
personal characteristics of the individual or group which has the effect of
imposing burdens, obligations, or disadvantages on such individual or
group not imposed upon others, or which withholds or limits access to
opportunities, benefits and advantages available to other members of
society .61
The severe problems with this effects-based approach for the equality of
African Canadians, those falling far from the "norm," would be made
increasingly apparent in subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court.
Those decisions revealed the painful limitations inherent in Andrews: that
the subjective perspectives of the powerful, white, male judges would
continue to dichotomize, and to determine who was sufficiently norma-
tive to be worthy of section 15 equal protection. The hidden dichotomy
of "norm" versus "other" has thus led to discriminatory, unequal results
under the very constitutional equal rights provision, that is meant to
protect these vulnerable, "discrete and insular minorit[ies]" !62
60. [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143, 56 D.L.R. (4th) 1 [hereinafter Andrews, cited to D.L.R.].
61. Ibid. at 18 [emphasis added].
62. Ibid. at 32 per Wilson, J. As she noted there, the section 15 equality guarantee was meant
to protect "discrete and insular minorit[ies] ... group[s] lacking in political power and as such
vulnerable to having their interests overlooked and their rights to equal concern and respect
violated."
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I give only two brief illustrations of this point here. In Symes v.
Canada,63 the two dissenters and only women on the Court revealed what
had been hidden: that Mr. Andrews was very much part of the unstated,
assumed "norm" as a white, male, able-bodied lawyer.' In Andrews, the
Court had willingly extended to him norm[ative], equal treatment.
However, in Symes, the majority of the Court would not extend to Ms.
Symes equal treatment on the basis of sex.65 She had argued that as a
woman in business, her child-care expenses should be an allowable
income-tax business deduction as an expense incurred for the purpose of
gaining or producing income.
Even more strikingly, in Egan v. Canada66 the Supreme Court denied
the claim to equal treatment on the basis of sexual orientation, upholding
Parliament's definition of "spouse" as being limited in meaning to only
opposite-sex couples. Using its new requirement of relevance, the Court
found that the impugned distinction was relevant because heterosexuality
was "obvious and deeply rooted in [Canadian] fundamental values and
traditions, values and traditions that could not have been lost on the
framers of the Charter."67 Thus, norm[ative], equal treatment under
section 15 was denied to same-sex couples.
Those who fall more than one step from the unstated "norm"-those
most needing equal protection-are least likely to receive the equal
treatment of the "norm." These claimants live at the "intersection" of
several grounds of disadvantage and are required by the categories in
equal protection laws to divide and "disaggregate" their experience of
discrimination and themselves into the discrete, existing categories of
equal protection laws. In the United States, black women have asked
courts to recognize that they are more than the simple combination of race
and sex. Courts have limited their claims to "sex plus" (or "race plus")
only one other category. 68 Thus, a person even farther removed from the
63. [199314 S.C.R. 695, 110 D.L.R. (4th) 470 [hereinafter Symes, cited to D.L.R.].
64. I am told he was also South African.
65. In Symes, supra note 60, those two, dissenting judges said, "[The majority] refers to ...
the fact that single mothers may provide a clearer example of hardship suffered as a
consequence of child care than does Ms. Symes. This may well be true, but this is no reason
why [her] rights, under... section 15 of the Charter, should not be protected .... This is not
the standard to which Mr. Andrews was held .... In Andrews, the Court did not look at the
respondent and justify the infringement of his rights under section 15 on the basis that, in all
other aspects of his life, as a white male lawyer of British descent, such discrimination on the
basis of citizenship was acceptable, since he was likely better off than most other persons in
the disadvantaged group of non-Canadian citizens": ibid. at 510.
66. [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513,124 D.L.R. (4th) 609 [hereinafter Egan, cited to D.L.R.].
67. Ibid. at 625.
68. See for example, Jeffries v. Harris County Community Action Association, 615 F. 2d.
1025 (1980) and Judge v. Marsh, 649 F. Supp. 770-1 (1986).
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"norm," for example a black woman with a physical disability, would be
unable to bring a claim for her experience of discrimination based on her
whole, undivided, "undisaggregated" self. The Supreme Court of Canada
has not yet even begun to address openly the grave, inequitable conse-
quences of the limits of dichotomization and comparison to a "norm,"' 69
particularly for those who are perceived to live at these intersections.70
In R.D.S., thejudge whose decision was appealed on the ground of bias
was at the intersection of race and gender grounds as an African Canadian
woman. The importance of revealing the hidden, false dichotomy of
"norm" versus "other" was thus essential to the Court's finding of no
apprehension of bias. As I argued before the Court,
All judges bring their own experiences to bear on the process of adjudica-
tion. To require Judge Sparks, an African Canadian woman born in Nova
Scotia, to divorce herself from her environment would be to require her to
be a machine... reflect[ing] [only] "normative", white, male, able-bodied
... perspectives ....
Not only would it be unreasonable to apprehend bias in this case - it would
be unconstitutional .... For, substantively, the effect of [failing to take]
race into account ... would be to deny an [African Canadian] accused the
right to equal treatment under.., the Charter.7 The substantive effect [of
such failure] would also be to impose on an African Canadian judge, the
[unequal, impossible] burden not imposed upon other judges, of not
bringing her own common sense, knowledge and life experience to bear
where race is a factor.
72
It is hoped that one future implication of R.D.S. will be an understanding
of how the false, hidden dichotomy of "norm" versus "other" works
actively to subvert the constitutional guarantee of equality in section 15
of the Charter.
69. See however L'Heureux-Dubf's dissent in Egan, supra note 63 at 635-37; and the
dissenting opinions of the two women on the Supreme Court of Canada in McKinney v.
University of Guelph, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 229,76 D.L.R. (4th) 545 at 626-7 (per Wilson J.) where
they recognized that the mandatory retirement scheme under consideration had particularly
harmful effects on older women living at the intersection of age and gender.
70. See Dartmouth/Halifax County Regional Housing Authority v. Sparks (1993), 101
D.L.R. (4th) (N .S .C.A.) 224 at 232-35, where the court recognized that public housing tenants
lived at the intersections of race, gender, age and family status.
71. An accused's Charter rights include the right to life, liberty and security of the person:
section 7; the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law in a fair and
public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal: Section 1 (d); and the right to
equality: section 15; see also R. v. Williams, supra note 45 at 22-23.
72. See paragraphs 38-47 of the Coalition's factum and my oral argument before the Court,
supra note 3.
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3. Implications Outside the Charter
a. An Expansive Equality. The False Dichotomy of Legal Equality
Within versus Outside the Charter
In arriving at the decision, the four-member majority reasons of the
R .D.S. Court made specific mention of Charter section 15 equality values
as part of the fundamental values on which Canada is based.73 Thus,
although not directly relying on section 15, they focused on its equality
values as part of the very atmosphere in which Canadian society must
"live and move and have [its] being."74 Seen in this light, the value of
equality is not subject to many of the Charter's severe limitations. Rather,
freed of the confines of the Charter's limiting context, the fundamental
value of equality can expand and grow.
This notion of an expansive equality, not limited to the specific
confines of the Charter, was particularly relevant in R.D.S. For, in an
earlier case, the Supreme Court of Canada had excluded the decisions of
judges from the specific ambit of the Charter as not being "government 7 5
for the purposes of section 32 of the Charter.7 6 It was imperative to make
the guarantee of equality apply to this decision of an African Canadian
female judge who acquitted an African Canadian youth, despite the
Supreme Court's earlier ruling. Expanding the section 15 guarantee of
equality beyond the specific confines of the Charter achieved that result,
and as I argued, "ma[de] the guarantee of equality real, not illusory or
ethereal ."
73. They stated, "Canada . . . supports the fundamental principles entrenched in the
Constitution by the ... Charter ... includ[ing] the principles of equality set out in s.15 ....
The reasonable person must be taken to be aware of the history of discrimination faced by
disadvantaged groups in Canadian society protected by the Charter's equality provisions."
Ibid at 507-8.
74. Acts of the Apostles 17: 28.
75. See R. W. D. S. U. Local 580 v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573,33 D. L. R.
(4th) 174 in respect of ajudge's decision in a labour dispute. For the recent, hopeful broadening
of "government," see Eldridge v. Attorney General of B.C., [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624 where
"government" was held to include hospitals (once held by the Court to be private and not
government) once they were fulfilling a specific, public, governmental function. See also R.
v. Williams, supra note 45 at 22, where the Court states "particularly, where Parliament confers
a discretion on a judge, it is presumed the Parliament intended the judge to exercise that
discretion in accordance with the Charter.
76. Section 32 (1) provides,
"this Charter applies
(a) to the Parliament and government of Canada in respect of all matters within the authority
of Parliament including all matters relating to the Yukon Territory and Northwest Territories;
and
(b) to the legislature and government of each province in respect of all matters within the
authority of the legislature of each province" [emphasis added].
77. Supra note 3 (oral argument of Coalition).
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Indeed, this idea of an all-pervasive equality is not new. It is well
known to the Supreme Court of Canada78 and in Continental jurispru-
dence .9
It is hoped that one future implication of R.D.S. will be the growth of
this notion of an expansive equality, which will govern even outside the
specific confines of the Charter and, in so doing, lead to the equal
protection of those most vulnerable among us.
4. Implications Outside Law: Towards a Non-Comparative Equality.
The False Dichotomy Inherent in All Comparison
In R.D.S., I caught a glimpse of the transforming vision of a non-
comparative equality. In Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, its
first and the leading case on section 15 equality under the Charter, the
Supreme Court of Canada specifically found that equality was "a com-
parative concept."" As long as equality remains comparative, the ques-
tion arises, "comparative to what or whom?" and the measure of an
objective "norm" as the standard of comparison is automatically sought
and assumed.
As discussed earlier, comparison with the unstated, assumed "norm"
of a white, able-bodied, heterosexual male has led to grave inequalities.
And the further one is from this "norm," (i.e., the more one needs equal
protection) the less likely one is to receive equal protection!8 Moreover,
as the standard of comparison, the treatment of the existing "norm"
becomes the definition of equal treatment. Thus, our concepts of what
78. For example, Madame Justice L'Heureux-Dubd has said, "The paradigm of equality now
extends far beyond the traditional human rights domain. It offers us new understandings in
family law, in criminal law and into how the law affects the poor and the elderly. It is changing
the way we approach sexual harassment, sexual assault, freedom of expression and pornogra-
phy." The Honourable Justice Claire L'Heureux-Dub, "Justice or 'Just us': Some Brief
Thoughts on Equality" (Notes for an address to Dalhousie University, 31 October 1997)
[unpublished]; see also, for example, A. M. v. Ryan, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 157 (in respect of the
fundamental value of equality in a family law matter); R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (in
respect of the fundamental value of equality in a freedom of expression, criminal law matter);
R. v. Seaboyer, [ 1991] 2 S.C.R. 577 (in respect of the fundamental value of equality in a sexual
assault matter); R. v. Williams, supra note 45 at 22-24 where the Supreme Court held that
statutory provisions and judicial discretion must be interpreted in light of Charter equality
values and in accordance with applicable Charter rights. See also s.26 of the Charter.
79. For example, under the European Convention on Human Rights, the guarantee of equality
infuses all other rights: see Belgian Linguistic Case (No. 2) (1968) European Ct. H. R. Ser. A,
No. 6, 1 E.H.R.R. 252; "Respect for... human rights and fundamental freedoms ... are the
principles on which the European Community is based" in introduction to the European
Community treaties, (1998) 37 I.L.M. 56 at 57.
80. "[Equality] is a comparative concept, the condition of which may only be attained or
discerned by comparison with the condition of others .... Andrews, supra note 57 at 10.
81. Supra, Section 11.2(a).
No Dichotomies: Reflections on Equality for African Canadians
equal treatment should and can mean are falsely constricted by what
presently exists for the "norm." This has led to a present world, which
falsely limits choices for both "norm" and "other."
A truly transforming equality transcends the notion of comparison
altogether. The renowned Spanish philosopher, Miguel de Unamuno,
once asked, "Do you aspire to be equal to another, are you equal to
yourself?"82 True equality must thus lie in the internal finding of the self's
own spirit on which one's outward expression depends. And, seemingly
paradoxically, this very finding leads to the transforming knowledge of
the Oneness of all in the Spirit.
Thus is it hoped that one future implication of R.D.S. will be, not only
the recognition and confronting of racism in law, but more, the realization
of the transforming vision of an equal world that transcends all compari-
son and dichotomy.
Conclusion
I find it difficult, even more than a year removed from my appearance
before the Court in R.D.S., to put into words my personal sense of
disappointment, indignation and even outrage at the appeal of Judge
Sparks' decision. After all, what had she done but responsibly discharged
her duty as an adjudicator weighing contradictory testimony? Moreover,
I knew that judges, as opposed to administrative tribunals, were very
rarely appealed on the basis of bias, and never before on racial bias. I felt
a tremendous sadness for what this case said about the state of racism in
our country and for what Judge Sparks must have been personally
enduring because of it. 3 My heart echoed the wise words, here para-
phrased, of the learned Higginbotham J. when he said,
If [Canada] is going to have a total rendezvous with justice so that there can
be full equality for blacks, other minorities, and women, it is essential that
the 'instinct' for double standards be completely exposed and hopefully,
through analysis, those elements of irrationality can be ultimately eradi-
cated. It is regrettable that... [a judge] must take substantial time and effort
to answer... meritless allegations, but in some respects the [case] merely
highlight[s] the duality of burdens which blacks have in public life. Blacks
must meet not only the normal obligations which confront their col-
leagues, but often they must spend extraordinary amounts of time in
82. This is my own, loose translation of the actual question, "Pretendes ser igual al otro, eres
igual a ti mismo?"
83. Although she was the first, and I the second, African Canadian woman to graduate from
Dalhousie Law School, we rarely correspond and have never spoken, directly or indirectly,
about this case.
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answering irrational positions and assertions before they can fulfill their
primary public responsibilities.84
For me, the case spoke, at its essence, to the deep need of African
Canadians, part of slavery's vast diaspora, to find inclusion in Canada, a
country in which we have lived for centuries.85 It was more than time for
Canada to be cognizant and respectful of that need. I thus concluded my
oral argument before the Court with these words,
[T]his case is fundamentally about home. For centuries, since our forcible
enslavement from Africa, African Canadians have been seeking a place to
call our own, to which we have a right; a place where our experiences,
perspectives and knowledge are included as valid and valuable to the
greater whole.
My personal engagement with the R.D.S. case proved, at once, emotion-
ally moving, physically demanding,86 and academically challenging. So
intense was my effort, I remember being close to tears at the end of my
oral presentation. So too, were many of those listening in the public
galleries. And even all nine judges of the Supreme Court themselves
seemed mesmerized by the passion and conviction which formed part of
my reasoned arguments.87 This was no coincidence, for the guiding Spirit
of an ancestral "cloud of witnesses" 8  was present. It was this very Spirit,
often palpably felt, that was responsible for my preparation and argument
of the case and held everyone in the courtroom in Its thrall.
I have faith that RD.S., by its outer creation of no dichotomies, will
lead us all to the inner discovery that equality is indivisible.
84. Local Union 542, supra note 50 at 181-82.
85. In 1608, Mathieu de Coste, a black servant, was already working for Acadia's governor:
The Blacks in Canada, supra note 33 at 1.
86. Several years ago, I was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis.
87. The following day's Ottawa Citizen newspaper (11 March 1997), in its article about the
case entitled "Lawyer fights for 'silent, silenced'," began, "The nine white judges of the
country's top court sat in mesmerized silence as the young black lawyer in a wheelchair
preached for her people."
88. Hebrews 12:1.
